Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1990

Myrne M. Collier as personal representative of the
Estate of James A. Collier v. Kerry M. Heinz,
Southwest Virginia Shopping Center Associates :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randy S. Feil; Michael L. Ferrin; Edwards, McCoy & Kennedy; Attorneys for Respondent.
James R. Brown; Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Collier v. Heinz, No. 900138 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2528

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

James R. Brown (#456)
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7700

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KF U
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

M Y R N E M . C O L L I E R , as p e r s o n a
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e E s t a t e
of J a m e s A . C o l l i e r ,

P l a i n t i l l / uu iij.ii mi u' II

m<!!'l,»' nuIKi

ill' A P P E L L A N T

v.
K E R R Y M . H E I N Z , an i n d i v i d u a l ,
SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA SHOPPING
CENTER ASSOCIATES, a Utah
l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s h i p , and
KERRY M. HEINZ as general
p a r t n e r of S o u t h w e s t V i r g i n i d
Shopping Center Associates,
.'i|jf A .

No. 9 0 0 - 1 3 8 - C A
(Priority 14b)

,L .:,

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD' MDIflAL DISTRICT L-—'
STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRDP

COUNTY

Randy S. Fell
Mic h a e 1 L , F e i: i i i i
Edwards, McCoy & Kennedy
A t t o r n e y s for R e s p o n d e n t
57 W e s t 2 0 0 S o u t h , #400
Salt L a k e C i t y , U t a h 84 111

J a m e s R, Brown.
Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown,, & Dunn
A t t o r n e y s for A p p e l l a n t
370 E a s t S o u t h T e m p l e , S u i t e 400
Salt L a k e City, U t a h 8 4 1 1 1

'*

.

*

.

*

*

Vim •.

JL.

'm

•

"Hlff

James R. Brown (#456)
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7700
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MYRNE M. COLLIER, as personal
representative of the Estate
of James A, Collier,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

v.
KERRY M. HEINZ, an individual,
SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA SHOPPING
CENTER ASSOCIATES, a Utah
limited partnership, and
KERRY M. HEINZ as general
partner of Southwest Virginia
Shopping Center Associates,

No. 900-138-CA
(Priority 14b)

Defendant/Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP

Randy S. Feil
Michael L. Ferrin
Edwards, McCoy & Kennedy
Attorneys for Respondent
57 West 200 South, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

James R. Brown
Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn
Attorneys for Appellant
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

ISSUE OF APPEALS

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

ARGUMENT

3

POINT I

POINT II

THE FULL DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE DOES NOT
INCLUDE THE RELEASED INTERPARTNERSHIP
LOAN

3

THE ESTATE ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IS ONLY ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF ALLOWED
BY LAW

6

POINT III THE AWARDING OF ATTORNEY FEES IS
TANTAMOUNT TO REWRITING THE AGREEMENT
CONCLUSION

.

.

8
10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Barker v. Francis. 741 P.2d 548 (Ut. 1987)

.

Canyon Country Store v. Bracey. 781 P.2d 414 (Ut.
1989)

-ii-

.

9
8, 10

ISSUES ON APPEAL
There are two issues on appeal:
1.
clear

and

Whether the District Court correctly interpreted the

unambiguous

language

of

the

Settlement

Agreement

("Agreement") between the parties relating to the assignment and
release

by

the

estate

to

"advances"

and

"repayment

of

interpartnership loans," together with the release by Southwest
Virginia Shopping Center Associates ("Southwest") of the "claim for
repayment of the interpartnership loans."
2.

Whether

the

District

Court

correctly

awarded

attorney fees as consequential damages in light of the express
terms of the Agreement.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Myrne M. Collier, as personal representative of the
Estate of James A. Collier, deceased ("The Estate"), assigned to
Kerry M. Heinz
"advances" of

("Heinz") all of the Estate's rights to the
approximately

$907,331.30, which

advances were

applied toward interpartnership loans and the Estate released all
claims which it might otherwise have with respect to future
repayment of the interpartnership loans. (Agreement, paragraph 5,
R.100.)
Southwest

Virginia

Shopping

Center

Associates

("Southwest") dismissed its probate claims against the Estate
-1-

(Agreement, paragraph 12), and released, acquitted and discharged
all claims against the Estate.

(Agreement, paragraph 10.)

The Estate did retain its general partnership interest as
well as its limited partnership interest in Southwest. (Agreement,
paragraphs 2 and 3.) However, this retention does not allow for a
"repayment of an interpartnership loan," which loan was released
specifically in paragraph 5 of the Agreement, but is restricted to
the "general partner distribution interest" and any distribution
payable to a limited partner, exclusive of interpartnership loan
repayment.

(Agreement, paragraphs 2, 3 and 5.)

Heinz

and

Southwest

were

initially

contending

the

Agreement to be ineffective and not reflective of the parties'
understanding.
the

Estate's

(Answer of Defendants.)

Heinz's

and

Agreement

was

acknowledged as being effective and binding on the parties.

The

Southwest's

Motion

Motion

for

for

Summary

However, in response to

Summary

Judgment

Judgment,

and
the

Affidavit of Semkin in support of Heinz's and Southwest's Motion
for Summary Judgment tried to explain why the two positions, i.e.,
the Agreement was not reflective of the parties' understanding and
why Heinz and Southwest later acknowledged the Agreement was
binding.

The Estate unjustly criticizes the Semkin Affidavit in

the Respondent's Brief by taking the information of the two
positions out of context.

(Respondent's Brief, p. 9, 12 and 13.)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FULL DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE DOES NOT
INCLUDE THE RELEASED INTERPARTNERSHIP LOAN.
In paragraph 8 of the Agreement, the Estate did reserve
its distributive share under paragraphs 2 and 3 from the general
release of all claims. However, that reservation did not add back
the released

future interpartnership

loan repayments.

Under

paragraph 5, the Estate assigned the "advances" and "released any
right to any future interpartnership

loan repayments."

language is clear, concise and unambiguous.

The

It provides in

pertinent part:
The Estate hereby assigns, transfers and
conveys to Heinz all of the Estate's rights,
if any, to recover any part or all of the
amounts advanced by it to be applied toward
Interpartnership Loans, and the Estate hereby
releases any and all claims which it might
otherwise have with respect to the future
repayment, if any, of the Interpartnership
Loans•
The Estate in Respondent's Brief asserts:
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the
Estate released any and all claims it had with
respect
to
future
repayment
of
the
Interpartnership Loans, i.e., the right to
recover the $907,331.30 the Estate had
advanced. (Page 8 of Respondent's Brief.)
That statement is a deliberate obfuscation of the clear language of
paragraph 5.

The Estate seems willing to concede it is not
-3-

entitled to the "advances," but addresses the question as if the
advances

is

the

interpartnership

loan

repayment.

INTERPARTNERSHIP LOAN REPAYMENT IS DIFFERENT THAN ADVANCES.

THE
The

Estate's assertion at page 8 of the Respondent's Brief is correct
as a matter of law and contract interpretation, except when the
Estate

asserts

the

"advances"

interpartnership loans."
paragraph

5 clearly

is

the

"future

repayment

of

An examination of the provisions of

dispel

any doubt

that

the

advances

of

$907,331.30 by the Estate and a similar amount from Heinz were used
to apply toward certain interpartnership loans by the following
clear language:
The Estate and Heinz have advanced large sums
of money which have been applied toward
certain Interpartnership Loans. The amounts
so advanced by the Estate total approximately
$907,331.30.
It is true that the "advances" and "interpartnership loans" both
appear in paragraph 5. However, it is very clear that the advances
are not future repayments of the interpartnership loans by the
following language:
There have been loans made by and between some
or all of the Limited Partnerships (the socalled "Interpartnership Loans"), including,
without limitation, loans made through the socalled CHA Trust or through CHA to the extent
any part of the funds for such loans came from
Limited Partnerships. The Estate and Heinz
have advanced large sums of money which have
been applied toward certain Interpartnership
Loans. (Emphasis supplied.)

Paragraph 5 goes on to provide that no advances have been made by
either party (the Estate and Heinz) for a period in excess of four
years, and that no repayment of advances have been made.

Also,

that there may be theories upon which recovery could be claimed or
asserted for repayment of the advances.

Then, in clear and

unambiguous language, the Estate:
" . . . hereby assigns, transfers and conveys .
. . the Estate's rights . . . to recover . . .
the amounts advanced by it . . . applied
toward Interpartnership Loans, and the Estate
hereby releases
. . . all claims . . . to the future repayment
of the Interpartnership Loans.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Advances are earlier payments (some four years old) applied to
interpartnership loans. Interpartnership loans are existing loans
to the various partnerships.

Some partnerships are creditor

partnerships and some are debtor partnerships. However, the Estate
released any claim to any repayment of interpartnership loans.
The Estate simply wanted nothing further to do with
interpartnership loans, either by way of repayment or any liability
to pay any part thereof to the partnerships.

To this end, the

Agreement provides:
In consideration therefor [the assignment of
advances and release of future repayment of
the Interpartnership Loans, if any,] and in
consideration of other benefits to Heinz under
this Agreement, Heinz hereby agrees to
indemnify and hold harmless the Estate from
any and all claims, liabilities, causes of

action, demands, damages, costs and expenses
of any kind, whether known or unknown, fixed
or contingent, which may be asserted against
the Estate and which arise out of or are in
any way connected with Interpartnership Loans.
Heinz, therefore, was the beneficiary of the release of any future
repayment of interpartnership loan or loans.

The Estate had no

further interest in the "advances" or the future repayment of
interpartnership loans.
POINT II
THE ESTATE ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IS ONLY ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF ALLOWED BY LAW.
In the Court below, it was argued that the Estate had
released to Heinz any future repayment of interpartnership loans.
(See R.

326, Transcript 26-34, 48 and 49.)

The Estate is

inaccurate when it asserts in the Respondent's Brief at page 27:
Defendants attempt to raise for the first time
on appeal a claim that the Estate was
"overpaid" its limited partner distribution in
the amount of $4,257.04 because that sum has
as
its
source
the
repayment
of
the
Interpartnership Loan to Southwest Virginia.
Defendants did not raise this issue in their
pleadings or argument before the district
court. All argument raised and presented by
defendants
below
concerned
only
the
distributive share the Estate was entitled to
receive as a general partner of Southwest
Virginia.
The release of any future repayment of interpartnership loans
includes the release as a limited partner.
that the overpayment results.
-6-

It is from this source

No court is allowed to grant relief beyond that which a
party is entitled under a Motion for Summary Judgment. No evidence
was taken and the relief to which the Estate was entitled is:
a)

The Estate's distributive general partner share

less any repayment of interpartnership loans;
b)

The Estate's distributive limited partner share

less any repayment of interpartnership loans.
Those amounts are:
Net amount from sale of assets:

$1,429,000

$556,732.00

(To
be
divided
40%
to
general
partners, 60% to limited partners)

$ 872,268.00

(Return of capital to limited partners)

Division of net sale proceeds:
General Partners (40%)
Heinz
The Estate
$

111,346.40

$ 111,346.40

Limited Partners
$

872,268.00
334,039.20 (60%)
$1,206,307.20

Amounts Due to the Estate:
General Partner's Share

Limited Partner's Share
(3.66%)

$

111,346.40

$

44,150.84

$

48,415.44

Amounts Actually Paid:
General Partner's Share
$
$

53,080.11
111,346.40
58,266.29
-7-

Overpayment:
General Partner's Share

Limited Partner's Share

None
Net Due to Heinz:

$

4,264.60

$

4,264.60

Heinz and Southwest simply paid part of the judgment of the lower
court and deposited funds in an interest bearing account in lieu of
a supersedeas bond and appealed from the trial court's Judgment.
The fact that Heinz and Southwest overpaid a portion of the
Judgment does not give the Estate the right to assert in this Court
an improper amount when the basis of the entire Judgment is and has
been challenged.
POINT III
THE AWARDING OF ATTORNEY FEES
IS TANTAMOUNT TO REWRITING THE AGREEMENT.
The holding by the lower court simply puts attorney's
fees as a consequential damage in every contract action.

The

intent of the parties is clearly enunciated by the very provisions
of the Agreement. Those provisions are controlling as they express
the intent of the parties.

The intent of the parties is that no

one is entitled to attorney fees in the event of a breach. Canyon
Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414 (Ut. 1989) is not applicable
in this instance because the contract in Canyon, supra, involved an
insurance contract, in which the insured really had limited input#
while in this instance both parties had input, many drafts were
-8-

submitted and changes made, and the Agreement is the culmination
and expression of the parties' intent.
The parties did provide for remedies in the event of
default of the Agreement, see paragraphs 16 and 17. The terms of
the Agreement are contractual and not merely recitals. The parties
then acknowledged:
The parties acknowledge, declare and agree
that the terms of this Agreement have been
read by them and are fully understood and
voluntarily accepted for the purpose of making
a full, final and complete compromise,
adjustment and settlement of any and all
transactions, agreements, courses of dealings
which may have arisen or may arise, all under
the terms and conditions expressly contained
herein, and that this Agreement is entered
into for the sake of buying peace and avoiding
protracted and lengthy further efforts to
resolve disputes among the parties. (Emphasis
supplied.)
No clearer expression need be made to defeat any awarding of
attorney fees to any of the parties to the Agreement to allow an
award of fees simply rewrites the contract, which the courts are
not at liberty to do under the guise of interpretation. See Barker
v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Ut. 1987).

The inclusion of the term

"may arise" gives prospective application to the terms of the
Agreement. The Agreement specifically declined to include an award
for attorney fees.
Finally, if the Estate's position is adhered to, it would
allow a party and his counsel to agree to outrageous fees on the

basis that the award of fees "must be based on the prevailing
party's actual losses, i.e., its out-of-pocket expenses for legal
counsel."

(Canyon, supra, p.420.)
Damages, even consequential damages, are subject to

mitigation and reasonableness.

The Trial Court was not impressed

with the "reasonableness" of fees and expressed concern. To award
$18,597.00 fees for a matter which did not go to trial, but was
determined by cross-motions for summary judgment is not reasonable.
To award additional fees of over $7,000 to argue the consequential
damage issue and update the fees is evidence of unreasonableness.
This Court should strike all fees in conformity with the
express terms and provisions of the Agreement.
CONCLUSION
Heinz and Southwest are entitled to the following relief:
a)

A correct interpretation of the Agreement granting

to Heinz the assignment and release of the advances and any future
repayment of interpartnership loans;
b)

The Judgment of November 21, 1989, be reversed and

set aside;
c)

For judgment against the Estate for $4,264.60 plus

interest from and after November 27, 1989, until paid;
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d)

An order reversing and vacating the Judgment for

attorney fees of $18,579 dated May 22, 1990, said judgment being
contrary to the terms of the Agreement.
e)

For costs of this appeal.

DATED this the 31st day of
~~

^

DUNN

Defendants
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